# NETWORK DESIGN AND THE BRAESS PARADOX

Algorithmic Game Theory

Corelab E.C.E - N.T.U.A.

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# Outline



## 2 Approximation Algorithms - Inapproximability results



3 Frequency of Braess's Paradox

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# Outline



## 2 Approximation Algorithms - Inapproximability results



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# Selfish Routing

- <u>Problem</u>: route traffic in a network of selfish non-cooperative players.
- <u>Motivation</u>: simple examples show that Nash equilibria can be inefficient (Price of Anarchy).
- <u>Question</u>: which subnetwork will exhibit the best performance when used selfishly?

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#### Introduction

Approximation Algorithms - Inapproximability results Frequency of Braess's Paradox

## Braess's Paradox





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## Braess's Paradox





# The model

## • Directed network G = (V, E).

- Source *s* and destination *t*.
- Latency function  $l_e : \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \to \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ . We assume that  $l_e$ 's are continuous and non-decreasing.
- Traffic r, caused by an infinite population of players, each trying to route a negligible amount of traffic through an s t path.
- Let *P* be the set of simple *s* − *t* paths. Then, a flow *f* is non-negative vector indexed by *P*.
- Feasible flow  $f: \sum_{P \in \mathcal{P}} f_P = r$ .
- Flow on edges  $f_e = \sum_{P:e \in P} f_P$ .
- Latency of a path P:  $I_P(f) = \sum_{e \in P} I_e(f_e)$ .
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# Flows at Nash Equilibrium (1 / 2)

# Intuitively, each unit of flow travels along the minimum-latency path in a NE.

## Definition

A flow f feasible for (G, r, l) is at Nash equilibrium, or is a Nash (or Wardrop) flow, if for all  $P_1, P_2 \in \mathcal{P}$  with  $f_{P_1} > 0$  and  $\delta \in (0, f_{P_1}]$ , we have

$$I_{P_1}(f) \leq I_{P_2}(\tilde{f}),$$

where

$$\tilde{f}_{P} = \begin{cases} f_{P} - \delta, & \text{if } P = P_{1} \\ f_{P} + \delta, & \text{if } P = P_{2} \\ f_{P}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

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## Theorem

A flow f feasible for (G, r, l) is at Nash equilibrium iff for every  $P_1, P_2 \in \mathcal{P}$  with  $f_{P_1} > 0$ ,

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Thus, all s - t paths in NE with positive flow have **equal** latency, denoted by L(G, r, l).

Moreover, flows at NE always exist and are **unique** with respect to L(G, r, l).

Finally, there exists a directed acyclic Nash flow.

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# Formalizing our Problem

## Problem

Given an instance (G, r, l), find a subgraph H of G that minimizes L(H, r, l).

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# Properties of Nash Flows

## Lemma

For every instance (G, r, l), L(G, r, l) is a non-decreasing function of r.

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Let f be a flow feasible for (G, r, l). For a vertex v in G, let d(v) denote the length, with respect to edge lengths  $\{I_e(f_e)\}_{e \in E}$  of a shortest s - v path in G. Then f is at Nash equilibrium iff

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for all edges e = (v, w), with equality holding whenever  $f_e > 0$ .

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## 2 Approximation Algorithms - Inapproximability results



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# Linear Latency Functions

We consider latency functions of the form  $l_e(x) = a_e x + b_e$ ,  $a_e, b_e \ge 0$ . We then call the problem the LINEAR LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN. It is known that the price of anarchy in such networks is at most  $\frac{4}{3}$ .

## Algorithm (Trivial Algorithm)

Given an instance (G, r, l), build the whole network G.

## Lemma (Roughgarden - Tardos)

Let  $f^*$  and f be feasible and Nash flows, respectively, for an instance (G, r, I) with linear latency functions. Then,

$$C(f) \leq \frac{4}{3} \cdot C(f^*).$$

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# The trivial algorithm performance for LINEAR LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN

## Corollary

The trivial algorithm is a  $\frac{4}{3}$ -approximation algorithm for LINEAR LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN.

## Proof.

- Let H be the subgraph that minimizes L(H, r, l), and f and f\* be the flows at NE for (G, r, l) and (H, r, l).
- $C(f) = r \cdot L(G, r, l)$  and  $C(f^*) = r \cdot L(H, r, l)$ .
- $f^*$  feasible for (G, r, l), thus  $C(f) \leq \frac{4}{3}C(f^*)$ .
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# Optimality of the trivial algorithm (1 / 3)

## Theorem

For every  $\epsilon > 0$ , there is no  $\left(\frac{4}{3} - \epsilon\right)$ -approximation algorithm for LINEAR LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN, assuming  $P \neq NP$ .

We will use a reduction from the 2 DIRECTED DISJOINT PATHS (2DDP) problem: given a directed graph G = (V, E) and distinct vertices  $s_1, s_2, t_1, t_2 \in V$ , are there  $s_i - t_i$  paths  $P_i$  for i = 1, 2, such that  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are vertex-disjoint?

2DDP is NP-complete.

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# Optimality of the trivial algorithm (2 / 3)

### Proof.



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• If algorithm returns a subgraph *H* with *L*(*H*, 1, *I*) < 2, then "yes" instance of 2DDP, else "no".

• If "yes" instance, let  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  be vertext disjoint  $s_1 - t_1$  and  $s_2 - t_2$  paths. Obtain H by deleting all other edges. Observe now that  $L(H, 1, I) = \frac{3}{2} (1/2 \text{ routed in } s_1 \rightarrow t_1 \rightarrow t \text{ and } 1/2 \text{ in } s_2 \rightarrow t_2 \rightarrow t)$ . So,  $ALG \leq (\frac{4}{3} - \epsilon) \cdot \frac{3}{2} < 2$ .

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# Optimality of the trivial algorithm (3 / 3)

### Proof (continued).

- We will prove that if "no" instance, then L(H,1, I) ≥ 2 for all subgraphs of G', and so ALG ≥ 2.
- Split subgraphs of G' in 3 groups: (i) those with an  $s_2 t_1$  path, (ii) those with an  $s_1 t_2$  path and (iii) those with an  $s_i t_i$  path for exactly one  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ .
- In all cases, routing flow in such a path gives NE and L(H) = 2.
- Thus,  $ALG \ge OPT \ge 2$ , and so we solve 2DDP.

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## Interpretation of results

- Efficiently detecting Braess's Paradox in networks with linear latency functions is impossible (i.e. NP-hard). This holds even in the most severe cases, where  $PoA = \frac{4}{3}$ .
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- However, by restricting our linear latency functions only to strictly increasing ones, we can get positive results!

## Towards some positive results

For instances with strictly increasing linear latencies, the optimal flow is **unique** and can be efficiently computed.

#### Definition

An instance (G, r, l) is called *paradox-free* if for every subgraph H of G,  $L(H, r, l) \ge L(G, r, l)$ . An instance (G, r, l) is called *paradox-ridden* if there is a subgraph H of G, such that  $L(H, r, l) = L^*(G, r, l) = L(G, r, l)/PoA(G, r, l) \le L(G, r, l)$ .

<u>Note</u>: In a paradox-free instance PoA cannot be improved by edge removal.

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An instance (G, r, l) is called *paradox-free* if for every subgraph H of G,  $L(H, r, l) \ge L(G, r, l)$ . An instance (G, r, l) is called *paradox-ridden* if there is a subgraph H of G, such that  $L(H, r, l) = L^*(G, r, l) = L(G, r, l)/PoA(G, r, l) \le L(G, r, l)$ .

<u>Note</u>: In a paradox-free instance PoA cannot be improved by edge removal.

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## Towards some positive results

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# Detecting paradox-ridden networks

### Theorem (Fotakis, Kaporis, Spirakis)

Given an instance (G, r, I) with strictly increasing linear latencies, one can decide in polynomial time whether the instance is paradox-ridden or not.

#### Proof.

- We can efficiently compute the *unique* optimal flow  $f^*$ .
- We then compute the length d(v) of a shortest s v path wrt edge lengths  $\{l_e(f_e^*)\}_{e \in E^*}$  for all  $v \in V$ .
- $f^*$  Nash flow  $\Leftrightarrow \forall (u, v) \in E^*, d(v) = d(u) + l_{(u,v)}(f^*_{(u,v)}).$

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- Let (G, r, l) be an instance with l<sub>e</sub>(x) = a<sub>e</sub>(x) + b<sub>e</sub> and E<sup>c</sup> = {e ∈ E : a<sub>e</sub> = 0}. Let E<sup>i</sup> = E \ E<sup>c</sup> and let O be the set of optimal flows.

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## An LP formulation

(LP): min  $\sum f_e b_e$ , s.t.: PCFC  $\sum o_{(v,u)} + \sum f_{(v,u)} = \sum o_{(u,v)} + \sum f_{(u,v)}$  $u:(v,u)\in E^i$   $u:(v,u)\in E^c$   $u:(u,v)\in E^i$   $u:(u,v)\in E^c$  $\forall v \in V \setminus \{s, t\},\$  $\sum o_{(s,u)} + \sum f_{(s,u)} = r,$  $u:(s,u)\in E^i$   $u:(s,u)\in E^c$  $\sum o_{(u,t)} + \sum f_{(u,t)} = r,$ u:(u,t)∈E<sup>c</sup>  $u:(u,t)\in E^i$  $f_e > 0 \qquad \forall e \in E^c.$ 

## Some notes on the (LP)

- An optimal solution to (LP) corresponds to a feasible flow for (G, r, l) that agrees with o on all edges in E<sup>i</sup> and allocates traffic to the edges in E<sup>c</sup> so that the total latency is minimized.
- Optimal solutions to (LP)  $\stackrel{1-1}{\longleftrightarrow}$  Optimal flows in  $\mathcal{O}$ .
- Given an optimal flow o, the problem of checking if there is a *o* ∈ O that is a Nash flow on G<sub>o</sub> reduces to the problem of generating all optimal solutions of (LP) and checking whether some of them can be translated into a Nash flow on the corresponding subnetwork.
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# A positive result for arbitrary linear latencies (1 / 2)

#### Theorem

Given an instance (G, r, l) with arbitrary linear latencies where the corresponding (LP) has a unique optimal solution, one can decide in polynomial time whether the instance is paradox-ridden or not.

<u>Note</u>: In fact, it suffices to generate all optimal basic feasible solutions, as the (LP) allocates traffic to constant latency edges. Observe that if a feasible flow f is a Nash flow, then any solution f' with  $\{e : f'_e > 0\} \subseteq \{e : f_e > 0\}$  is a Nash flow, too.

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# Finding near-optimal subnetworks

- In general, finding optimal subnetworks in paradox-ridden instances is NP-hard.
- However, we can reach a subexponential-time approximation scheme on networks with polynomially many paths, each of polylogarithmic length.
- For this purpose, we need to turn our attention to "sparse" flows and  $\varepsilon$ -Nash flows.

#### Definition ( $\varepsilon$ -Nash flow)

For some  $\varepsilon > 0$ , a flow f is an  $\varepsilon$ -Nash flow if for every path P and P' with  $f_P > 0$ ,  $l_P(f) \le l_{P'}(f) + \varepsilon$ .

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# Making a flow "sparse" (1 / 3)

### Lemma (Fotakis, Kaporis, Spirakis)

Let (G, 1, I) be an instance on a graph G = (V, E), and let f be any feasible flow. For any  $\varepsilon > 0$ , there exists a feasible flow  $\tilde{f}$  that assigns positive traffic to at most  $\lfloor \log(2m)/(2\varepsilon^2) \rfloor + 1$  paths, such that  $|\tilde{f}_e - f_e| \le \varepsilon$ ,  $\forall e \in E$ .

#### Proof.

- Let  $\mu = |\mathcal{P}|$ , and we index the s t paths by integers in  $[\mu]$ .
- Flow f can be seen as a probability distribution on  $\mathcal{P}$ .
- We prove that if we select k > log(2m)/(2ε<sup>2</sup>) paths uniformly at random with replacement according to f, and assign to each path j a flow equal to the number of times j is selected divided by k, we obtain a flow that is an ε-approximation to f with positive probability. (Probabilistic Method)

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# Making a flow "sparse" (2 / 3)

### Proof (continued).

- Fix  $\varepsilon$  and let  $k = \lfloor \log(2m)/(2\varepsilon^2) \rfloor + 1$ .
- Define random variables  $P_1, ..., P_k \in [\mu]$ , i.i.d., such that  $P[P_i = j] = f_j$ .
- For each path  $j \in [\mu]$ ,  $F_j = |\{i \in [k] : P_i = j\}| / k$ . Note that  $\mathbf{E}[F_j] = f_j$ .
- For each edge *e* and random variable *P<sub>i</sub>*, define the independent indicator variables *F<sub>e,i</sub>* = 1 if *e* in path *P<sub>i</sub>*, otherwise 0.

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• By the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound we get that for every edge e

$$\Pr[|F_e - f_e| > \varepsilon] \le 2e^{-2\varepsilon^2 k} < 1/m$$

- Thus, by union bound,  $P[\exists e : |F_e f_e| > \varepsilon] < m(1/m) = 1$ .
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## Finding a near-optimal subnetwork

#### Theorem

Let  $(G(V, E), 1, \{a_ex + b_e\}_{e \in E})$  be an instance,  $\alpha = \max_{e \in E}\{a_e\}$ , and let  $H^B$  be the best subnetwork of G. For some constants  $d_1, d_2 > 0$ , let  $|\mathcal{P}| \leq m^{d_1}$  and  $|\mathcal{P}| \leq \log^{d_2} m$ , for all  $\mathcal{P} \in \mathcal{P}$ . Then, for any  $\varepsilon > 0$ , we can compute in time  $m^{O(d_1\alpha^2 \log^{2d_2+1}(2m)/\varepsilon^2)}$  a flow  $\tilde{f}$  that is an  $\varepsilon$ -Nash flow on  $G_{\tilde{f}}$  and satisfies  $l_{\mathcal{P}}(\tilde{f}) \leq L(H^B, 1, \{a_ex + b_e\}_{e \in E(H^B)}) + \varepsilon/2$ , for all paths  $\mathcal{P} \in G_{\tilde{f}}$ .

## Moving on to general latency functions

- We will now consider general (continuous, non-decreasing) latency functions (we call this problem the GENERAL LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN).
- We will see that the trivial algorithm is still the best thing we can do. However, the approximation factor gets worse.
- In order to prove the above, we will need new techniques, as in networks with general latency functions, a Nash flow can be arbitrarily more costly than other feasible flows.

## A useful tool in our approach

#### Definition

Let f be a Nash flow for the instance (G, r, l). Let d(v) denote the length of a shortest s - v path with respect to the edge lengths  $\{I_e(f_e)\}_{e \in E}$ . An ordering of the vertices of G is f-monotone if it satisfies the following two properties:

(P1) All *f*-flow travels forward in the ordering.

(P2) The d-values of vertices are non-decreasing in the ordering.

<u>Note</u>: It can be proved that an *f*-monotone ordering exists relative to a directed acyclic Nash flow.

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# The trivial algorithm performance for GENERAL LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN

#### Theorem

The trivial algorithm is a  $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor$ -approximation algorithm for GENERAL LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN.

#### Proof.

On board

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## Tightness of the $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor$ bound: the $B^k$ Braess Graph



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## Tightness of the $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor$ bound (1 / 2)

#### Theorem

For every integer  $n \ge 2$ , there is an instance (G, r, I) in which G has n vertices and a subgraph H with

$$L(G, r, l) = \left\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \right\rfloor \cdot L(H, r, l).$$

#### Proof.

- Assume that  $n \ge 4$  is even (otherwise, add an isolated vertex).
- So, n = 2k + 2 and we consider the instance  $(B^k, k, l^k)$ .
- NE for  $(B^k, k, l^k)$ : 1 unit on each path  $s \to v_i \to w_i \to t$ , and  $L(B^k, k, l^k) = k + 1$ .

## Tightness of the $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor$ bound (2 / 2)

#### Proof (continued).

- We now remove all A-type edges and obtain H.
- Routing k/(k+1) units on paths  $s \to v_1 \to t$ ,  $s \to w_k \to t$ and  $\{s \to v_i \to w_{i-1} \to t\}_{(i=2,...,k)}$ , we get a NE with  $L(H, k, l^k) = 1$ .

• Thus, 
$$L(G)/L(H) = k + 1 = n/2$$
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## Hardness of approximation for GENERAL LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN

#### Theorem (Roughgarden)

For every  $\epsilon > 0$ , there is no  $(\lfloor n/2 \rfloor - \epsilon)$ -approximation algorithm for GENERAL LATENCY NETWORK DESIGN, assuming  $P \neq NP$ .

Proof is based on a reduction from the NP-complete problem PARTITION.

Price of anarchy in networks with general latency functions

Theorem (Lin, Roughgarden, Tardos)

For every  $n \ge 2$  and every single-commodity instance (G, r, l) with n vertices,  $PoA(G, r, l) \le n - 1$ .

#### Lemma

For all  $k \ge 1$ , the only way to decrease the latency in a Nash flow by a factor strictly larger than k is to remove at least k edges from the network.

#### Theorem

The worst-case price of anarchy in multicommodity instances with at most n vertices is  $2^{\Omega(n)}$  as  $n \to \infty$ . Moreover, there are instances in which PoA can be reduced to 1 by edge removal.

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## Outline



#### 2 Approximation Algorithms - Inapproximability results



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## How often does Braess's paradox occur?

## <u>Question</u>: Is Braess's paradox often in practical networks or is it just a theoretical curiosity?

Valiant and Roughgarden answer that it occurs in many networks by utilizing random graph models.

#### Definition (Braess ratio)

The Braess ratio of a network is the largest factor by which the removal of one or more edges can improve the latency of traffic in an equilibrium flow.

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The Braess ratio of a network is the largest factor by which the removal of one or more edges can improve the latency of traffic in an equilibrium flow.

- Probability distribution oven graphs and edge latency functions.
- Graph G distributed according to the standard Erdös-Renyi G(n, p) model. For a fixed n ≥ 2, each edge is present independently with probability p. We assume that p = Ω(n<sup>-1/2+ϵ</sup>) for some ϵ > 0.
- Source s and destination t are chosen randomly or arbitrarily. (we assume that there is no edge (s, t)).
- Linear latency functions I(x) = ax + b,  $a, b \ge 0$ :
  - Independent coefficients model: two fixed distributions A and B, and each edge is independently given a latency function l(x) = ax + b, where a and b are drawn independently from A and B, respectively.
  - I/x model: each edge present in the graph (independently) has the latency function l(x) = x with probability q and l(x) = 1 with probability 1 - q.

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## Main results

#### Theorem (Independent coefficients model)

Let A and B be reasonable distributions. There is a constant p = p(A, B) > 1 such that, with high probability, a random network (G, I) admits a choice of traffic rate r such that the Braess ration of the instance (G, r, I) is at least p.

#### Theorem (The 1/x model)

There is a traffic rate R = R(n, p, q) such that, with high probability as  $n \to \infty$ , the Braess ratio of a random n-node network from  $\mathcal{G}(n, p, q)$  with traffic rate R is at least

$$\frac{4-3pq}{3-2pq}.$$

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## THANK YOU!

Algorithmic Game Theory

NETWORK DESIGN AND THE BRAESS PARADOX 42/42

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